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In this paper we consider open-loop Nash equilibria of the linear-quadratic dierential
game. As well the nite-planning-horizon, the innite-planning horizon as convergence
properties of the nite-planning-horizon equilibrium if the planning horizon is extended
to innity are studied. Particular attention is paid to computational aspects and the
scalar case.




The last decade there has been an increasing interest to study several problems in
economics using a dynamic game theoretical setting. In particular in the area of en-
vironmental economics and macro-economic policy coordination this is a very natural
framework to model problems (see e.g. de Zeeuw et al. (1991), Maler (1992), Kaitala
et al. (1992) and Dockner et al. (1985), Tabellini (1986), Fershtman et al. (1987),
Petit (1989), Levine et al. (1994), van Aarle et al. (1995), Douven et al (1996)). In,
e.g., policy coordination problems usually two basic questions arise i.e., rst, are policies
coordinated and, second, which information do the participating parties have. Usu-
ally both these points are rather unclear and, therefore, strategies for dierent possible
scenarios are calculated and compared with eachother. One of these scenarios is the
so-called open-loop strategy. This scenario can be interpreted as that the parties si-
multaneously determine their strategy, next submit their strategies to some authority
who then enforces these plans as binding commitments. So, this strategy is based on
the assumption that the parties act non-cooperatively and that the only information
they have on the model is its present state and the model structure. Obviously, since
according this scenario the participating parties can not react to eachother's policies,
its economic relevance is mostly rather limited. However, as a benchmark to see how
much parties can gain by playing other strategies, it plays a fundamental role. Due to
its analytic tractability the open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy is in particular very
popular for problems where the underlying model can be described by a (set of) lin-
ear dierential equation(s) and the individual objectives, the parties are striving for,
can be approximated by functions which quadratically penalize deviations from some
(equilibrium) targets. Under the assumption that the parties only have a nite-planning
horizon, this problem was rst modeled and solved in a mathematically rigorous way
by Starr and Ho in (1969). However, due to some inaccurate formulations it is, even in
nowadays literature, an often encountered misunderstanding that this problem always
has a unique Nash equilibrium strategy which can be obtained in terms of the solutions
of a set of coupled matrix dierential equations resembling (but more complicated than)
the matrix Riccati equations which arise in optimal control theory. Eisele, who extended
the Hilbert space approach of this problem taken by Lukes et al (1971), in (1982) already
noted that there are some misleading formulations in the literature. But, probably due
to the rather abstract approach he took, this point was not noted in the mainstream
literature. So, in other words, there exist situations where the set of coupled matrix dif-
ferential equations has no solution, whereas the problem does have an equilibrium. We
will present such an example here and use the more direct simple Hamiltonian approach
to analyze the problem. In addition to its simplicity this approach has the advantage
that it also permits an elementary study of convergence of the equilibrium strategy if the
planning horizon expands. Like in the theory on optimal control it turns out that under
some conditions it can be shown that this strategy converges. One nice property of this
converged solution is, as we will see, that it is rather easy to calculate and much easier
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to implement than any nite planning horizon equilibrium solution. One would expect
that this (converged) solution also solves the problem if the parties consider an innite-
planning horizon. Remarkably, however, the author was not able to trace a reference in
literature dealing with this subject in a rigorous mathematical way. Particularly in the
economic literature one either sticks to considering the limiting behaviour of the above
mentioned nite-planning horizon solution, or imposes some additional constraints (e.g.
the no-Ponzi game condition (see e.g. van Aarle et al. (1995))) on the solution of this
problem. Therefore, we will consider this problem in somewhat more detail here. Two
remarkable points we will see are that it may happen that, rst, though the problem
may have a unique equilibrium strategy for an arbitrary nite-planning horizon, there
may exist more than one equilibrium solution for the innite-planning horizon case and,
second, the limit of this unique nite-planning horizon equilibrium solution may be not a
solution for the innite-planning horizon problem. On the other hand we will see that it
can be easily veried whether the limiting solution of the nite-planning horizon problem
solves also the innite-planning horizon case.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two we start by stating the problem
analysed in this paper and show how both a necessary and sucient condition, in terms
of a rank condition on a matrix, can be derived for the existence of a unique open-loop
Nash equilibrium using the Hamiltonian approach. Moreover, we present the relationship
that exists between solvability of a set of Riccati dierential equations and solvability of
the problem. Furthermore we give some simple sucient conditions guaranteeing solv-
ability of these Riccati dierential equations. Before we present the convergence results
of the nite-planning horizon equilibrium solution in section 4, we rst consider the
algebraic equations associated with the set of Riccati dierential equations, and their
solutions. In section 3 we show how all solutions of these equations can be determined
from the eigenstructure of a certain matrix M , and that the eigenvalues of the asso-
ciated closed-loop system, obtained by applying the limiting equilibrium strategy, are
completely determined by the eigenvalues of this matrixM . A number of the results pre-
sented in sections 3 an 4 are also reported by Abou-Kandil et al. (1993). The conditions
under which they derive the results are however not always completely specied and their
proofs are of a more analytic nature. Therefore we choose to give here a selfcontained
exposition including their results. The results on the innite-planning horizon case are
discussed in section 5. In particular we show that if the participating parties discount
their future objectives, then the nite-planning horizon equilibrium solution converges
to a limit which is generically the unique solution to the innite-plannning horizon case,
if the discount factor is large enough. Finally, in section 6 we study the scalar case which
is of particular interest for many economic applications. We show that in the scalar case,
under a mild regularity condition, everything works out ne. This, in the sense that in
this case the nite-planning equilibrium solution can be obtained by solving the set of
Riccati dierential equations and that the equilibrium solution converges to a stationary
stabilizing feedback policy which also solves the innite-planning horizon problem.
The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
4
II. The nite-planning horizon case
In this paper we consider the problem where two parties (henceforth called players)
try to minimize their individual quadratic performance criterion. Each player controls
a dierent set of inputs to a single system, described by a dierential equation of ar-
bitrary order. As already mentioned in the introduction we assume that both players
have to formulate their strategy already at the moment the system starts to evolve and
this strategy can not be changed once the system runs. So, the players have to minimize
their performance criterion based on the information that they only know the dierential
equation and its initial state. We are looking now for combinations of pairs of strate-
gies of both players which are secure against any attempt by one player to unilaterally
alter his strategy. That is, for those pairs of strategies which are such that if one player
deviates from his strategy he will only lose. In the literature on dynamic games this
problem is well-known as the open-loop Nash non-zero-sum linear quadratic dierential
game (see e.g. Starr and Ho (1969), Simaan and Cruz (1973), Basar and Olsder (1982)
or Abou-Kandil and Bertrand (1986)). Formally the system we consider is as follows:
_x = Ax+B1u1 +B2u2; x(0) = x0; (1)
where x is the n-dimensional state of the system, ui is an m-dimensional (control) vector
player i can manipulate, x0 is the initial state of the system, A;B1, and B2 are constant
matrices of appropriate dimensions, and _x denotes the time derivative of x.






















in which all matrices are symmetric and, moreover, both Qi and Kif are semi-positive
denite and Rii are positive denite.
In this section we consider in detail the existence of a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium
of this dierential game. Due to the stated assumptions both cost functionals Ji; i = 1; 2,
are strictly convex functions of ui for all admissible control functions uj; j 6= i and for
all x0. This implies that the conditions following from the minimum principle are both
necessary and sucient (see e.g. Basar and Olsder (1982, section 6.5)).








Ri2u2) +  
T
i (Ax+B1u1 +B2u2); i = 1; 2
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with respect to ui yields the optimality conditions (see e.g. Basar and Olsder (1982) or















where the n-dimensional vectors  1(t) and  2(t) satisfy
_ 1(t) =  Q1x(t) AT 1(t); with  1(tf) = K1fx(tf)
_ 2(t) =  Q2x(t) AT 2(t); with  2(tf) = K2fx(tf)
and
_x(t) = Ax(t)  S1 1(t)  S2 2(t); x(0) = x0:



























with boundary conditions x(0) = x0;  1(tf ) K1fx(tf) = 0 and  2(tf) K2fx(tf) = 0;




(t))T by y(t), we can
rewrite this two-point boundary value problem in the standard form

























From (4) we have immediately that problem (1) has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium
if and only if




(PeMtf +Q)e Mtfy(0) = (xT
0
0 0)T ; (5)
is uniquely solvable for every x0.
Using the following notation:
H(tf ) := W11(tf) +W12(tf)K1f +W13(tf )K2f ;
with W (tf) = (Wij(tf)) fi; j = 1; 2; 3; Wij 2 Rnng := exp(Mtf ),
elementary matrix analysis then shows that
Theorem 1:
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The two-player linear quadratic dierential game (1) has a unique open-loop Nash equi-
librium for every initial state if and only if matrix H(tf) is invertible. Moreover, the
open-loop Nash equilibrium solution as well as the associated state trajectory can be
calculated from the linear two-point boundary value problem (4). 2
Next, consider the following set of coupled asymmetric Riccati-type dierential equa-
tions:
_K1 =  ATK1  K1A Q1 +K1S1K1 +K1S2K2; K1(tf ) = K1f (6)
_K2 =  ATK2  K2A Q2 +K2S2K2 +K2S1K1; K2(tf ) = K2f (7)
Let Ki(t) satisfy this set of Riccati equations and assume that player i uses the strategy
ui(t) =  R 1ii BTi Ki(t)x(t) to control system (1).
Now, dene  i(t) := Ki(t)x(t). Then, obviously _ i(t) = _Ki(t)x(t) +Ki(t) _x(t).
Substitution of _Ki from (6,7) and _x from (1) yields
_ i = ( ATKi  Qi)x =  AT i  Qix:
So, the two-point boundary value problem (4) has a solution. This proves the following
claim:
Theorem 2:
The two-player linear quadratic dierential game (1) has a unique open-loop Nash equi-
librium for every initial state provided the set of Riccati equations (6,7) has a solution.















Here (t; 0) satises the transition equation
_(t; 0) = (A  S1K1   S2K2)(t; 0); (t; t) = I




i ; i = 1; 2: 2
The following example shows that there exist situations where the set of Riccati dif-
ferential equations (6,7) does not have a solution, whereas there exists an open-loop
































; and R22 = 1:
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K2f =: V  (I K1f K2f)T :








, where h1 =
 V (1;2) V (2;3) V (2;5)10
V (2;4)








, where h2 =
 V (2;2) V (2;3)K1f(1;2) V (2;4)K1f(2;2)
V (2;5)
: Then, clearly, both K1f
and K2f are positive denite whereas the last row of H(0:1) contains, by construction,






So, according to theorem 1 the problem has not for every initial state a unique open-
loop Nash equilibrium, and therefore (see theorem 2) the corresponding set of Riccati
dierential equations has no solution.
Next consider H(0:11). Numerical calculation shows that with the system parameters
as chosen above, H(0:11) is invertible. So, according to theorem 1 again, the game does
have an open-loop Nash equilibrium for tf = 0:11. However, since the set of Riccati
dierential equations can be rewritten as one autonomous vector dierential equation,
whose solutions are known to be shift invariant, it is clear that the corresponding set
of Riccati dierential equations can not have a solution for tf = 0:11, since it has no
solution for tf = 0:1. 2
Note that the above theorems are in fact local results. That is, they just make state-
ments concerning existence of an equilibrium strategy for a xed point in time. As we
will see in a moment, the existence of an equilibrium strategy for every point in time
during some xed time interval [0; tf ] is equivalent to the existence of a solution to the
set of Riccati dierential equations (6,7) on this interval.
One part of this conjecture is rather immediate. Assume that we know that the set of
Riccati dierential equations has a solution on [0; tf ], then due to the time-invariance
property of these dierential equations also a solution exists to this set of equations for
every point t1 2 [0; tf ]. So, according theorem 2 there will exist an open-loop equilibrium
strategy at every point in [0; tf ].
On the other hand, if the open-loop problem has a solution it follows immediately from











Since y(t) = e Mty0, it follows that the entries of y(t) can be rewritten as


























Using the previously introduced notation for H(t), we see that (10) can be rewritten as
x(t) = H(tf   t)H 1(tf )x0:
Since by assumption (see theorem 1) the matrix H(tf   t) is invertible it follows that
H 1(tf )x0 = H
 1(tf   t)x(t):
Substitution of this expression into the equations for  i; i = 1; 2, in (11,12) yields:
 1(t) = G1(tf   t)H 1(tf   t)x(t) and (13)
 2(t) = G2(tf   t)H 1(tf   t)x(t) (14)
for some continuously dierentiable matrix functions Gi; i = 1; 2: and H
 1(:). Now,
denote Gi(tf   t)H 1(tf   t) by Ki(t); i = 1; 2: Then, from (13), (14) it follows that
_ i = _Kix+Ki _x; i = 1; 2:
From (2,3) we have that  1(t) and  2(t) satisfy
_ 1(t) =  Q1x(t) AT 1(t); with  1(tf ) = K1fx(tf);
_ 2(t) =  Q2x(t) AT 2(t); with  2(tf) = K2fx(tf)
and
_x(t) = Ax(t)  S1 1(t)  S2 2(t); x(0) = x0:
Substitution of _ i and  i; i = 1; 2 into these formulas yields
( _K1+A
TK1+K1A+Q1 K1S1K1 K1S2K2)eMtx0 = 0 with (K1(tf) K1f )eMtfx0 = 0; and
( _K2+A
TK2+K2A+Q2 K2S2K2 K2S1K1)eMtx0 = 0 with (K2(tf) K2f)eMtfx0 = 0;
for arbitrarily chosen x0.
From this it follows that Ki(t); i = 1; 2 satisfy the set of Riccati dierential equations
(6,7). This proves the following result:
Theorem 4:
The following statements are equivalent:
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1) For all t 2 [0; t1] there exists a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium for the two-player
linear quadratic dierential game (1).
2) H(t) is invertible for all t 2 [0; t1].
3) The set of Riccati dierential equations (6,7) has a solution on [0; t1]. 2
The above theorem shows that for both computational purposes and for a better theoret-
ical understanding of the open-loop problem it would be nice to have a global existence
result for the set of Riccati dierential equations (6,7). Up to now this is, however, an
unsolved problem. Sucient conditions reported in literature on this subject (like the
assumption that Q2 = Q1, see e.g. Abou-Kandil et al. (1986)) usually satisfy either
one of the following cases (see Feucht (1994)):
Proposition 5:
The set of Riccati dierential equations (6,7) has a solution on [0; tf ] if either one of the
next conditions is satised:
1) Either, (.1) there exist matrices S and Ci; i = 1; 2 such that: i) Si = SCi; i = 1; 2, ii)
CiA
T = ATCi; i = 1; 2, iii) S + S
T  0, iv) C1Q1+C2Q2+ (C1Q1 +C2Q2)T  0; and v)
C1K1f + C2K2f + (C1K1f + C2K2f )
T  0:
or, "dually", (.2) there exist matrices Q and Di; i = 1; 2 such that: i) Qi = DiQ; i = 1; 2,
ii) DiA
T = ATDi; i = 1; 2, iii) Q+Q
T  0, iv) S1D1+S2D2+ (S1D1+S2D2)T  0; and
v) K1fD1 +K2fD2 + (K1fD1 +K2fD2)
T  0:
2) The model parameters satisfy the conditions: i) SiA
T = ASi; i = 1; 2, ii) K1fS1 +
S1K1f+K2fS2+S2K2f (A+AT)  0, and iii)A2+AT 2+Q1S1+Q2S2+S1Q1+S2Q2  0.
2
If condition 1 of the proposition is satised and the matrix C1 is invertible, matrix

















CA). This property can be helpful in calculating e.g. the eigenstructure
of matrixM . If e.g. matrix S is symmetric, C1Q1+C2Q2 is both symmetric and invert-
ible andM is dichotomically separable (see section 4) then this property implies that the
nite game always has a solution which converges to a solution of the innite-planning
horizon problem, if the planning horizon expands to innity.
III. The solutions for the algebraic Riccati equation
In this section we consider the set of solutions satisfying the set of so-called algebraic
Riccati equations corresponding with (6,7)
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0 =  ATK1  K1A Q1 +K1S1K1 +K1S2K2;
0 =  ATK2  K2A Q2 +K2S2K2 +K2S1K1;
)
(ARE)
MacFarlane (1963) and Potter (1966) independently discovered that there exists a re-
lationship between the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation and the
eigenvectors of a related Hamiltonian matrix in linear quadratic regulator problems. We
will follow their approach here and formulate similar results for our problem (1). In fact
Abou-Kandil et al. (1993) already pointed out the existence of a similar relationship.
One of their results is that if the planning horizon tf in (1) tends to innity, under some
technical conditions on the matrixM , the solution of the above mentioned set of Riccati
dierential equations converges to a solution of the set of (ARE) which can be calculated
from the eigenspaces of matrix M.
In this section we elaborate on the relationship between solutions of (ARE) and ma-
trix M in detail. We present both necessary and sucient conditions in terms of the
matrix M under which (ARE) has (a) real solution(s). In particular we will see that
all solutions of (ARE) can be calculated from the invariant subspaces of M and that
the eigenvalues of the associated closed-loop system, obtained by applying the control
ui (t) =  R 1ii BTi Ki(t)x(t), are completely determined by the eigenvalues of matrix M.
As a corollary from these results we obtain both necessary and sucient conditions for
the existence of a stabilizing control of this type, a result which will be used in the next
section.
In our analysis the set of all M -invariant subspaces plays a crucial role. Therefore we
introduce a separate notation for this set:
Minv := fT jMT  T g.
It is well-known (see e.g. Lancaster and Tismenetsky (1985)) that this set contains only
a nite number of (distinct) elements if and only if all eigenvalues ofM have a geometric
multiplicity one.
The set of possible solutions for the algebraic Riccati equation can, as will be shown














Note that elements in the set Kpos can be calculated using the set of matrices
Kpos :=












The exact result on how all solutions of (ARE) can be calculated is given in the next
theorem. Its proof can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 6:
(ARE) has a real solution (K1;K2) if and only if K1 = Y X










Moreover, if the control functions ui (t) =  R 1ii BTi Ki(t)x0 are used to control the
system (1), the spectrum of the closed-loop matrix A   S1K1   S2K2 coincides with
( M jK). 2
From the above theorem a number of interesting properties concerning the solvabil-
ity of (ARE) follow. First of all we observe that every element of Kpos denes exactly
one solution of (ARE). Furthermore, this set contains only a nite number of elements
if and only if the geometric multiplicities of all eigenvalues of M is one. So, in that case
we immediately conclude that (ARE) will have at most a nite number of solutions and
that (ARE) will have no real solution if and only if Kpos is empty.
Another conclusion which immediately follows from the above theorem is that
Corollary 7:
(ARE) will have a set of solutions (K1;K2) stabilizing the closed-loop system matrix
A S1K1 S2K2 if and only if there exists anM invariant subspace K in Kpos such that
Re  > 0 for all  2 (M jK). 2
To illustrate some of the above mentioned properties, reconsider example 3.
Example 3 (continued):




are eigenvalues of M with mul-
tiplicity 2 and 1, respectively. Numerical calculations show that the other eigen-





; 1:7966g we have the following corresponding eigenspaces:
T1 = SpanfT11 T12g where T11 = (0 0 0 0 0 1)T ; and
T12 = ( 0:2024 0:6012   0:2620   0:0057 0:5161 0)T ;
T2 = SpanfT2g where T2 = ( 0:3726   0:2006 0:4229 0 0:6505 0:4679)T ;
T3 = SpanfT3g where T3 = (0:0079   0:0234 0:0097 0   0:0191   0:9995)T ;
T4 = SpanfT4g where T4 = (0:0580   0:1596 0:1160 0   0:2031 0:9573)T ;
and
T5 = SpanfT5g where T5 = ( 0:7274   0:1657   0:2601 0   0:3194   0:5232)T :
12




= 6 real solutions. Furthermore, there is no solution which stabilizes the closed-
loop system matrix.







CA := (T2 T3): This yields the solution






















The eigenvalues of the closed-loop system (1) using the control ui(t) =  R 1ii BTi Kix(t)
are f1:8810; 0:1883g: It is easily veried that the rank of the rst two rows of every other
candidate solution is also two, so we conclude that (ARE) has six solutions, none of
which is stabilizing. 2
IV. Convergence results
As argued in the introduction, it is interesting to see how the open-loop equilibrium
solution changes when the planning horizon tf tends to innity. To study convergence
properties for problem (1), it seems reasonable to require that problem (1) has a properly
dened solution for every nite planning horizon. Therefore in this section we will make
the following well-posedness assumption (see theorem 4)
H(tf) is invertible for all tf <1: (15)
Furthermore, we will see that general convergence results can only be derived if the
eigenstructure of matrix M satises an additional property, which we dene rst.
Denition 8:
M is called dichotomically separable if there exist subspaces V1 and V2 such that MVi 
Vi; i = 1; 2; V1  V2 = IR3n; where dimV1 = n; dimV2 = 2n; and moreover Re  >
Re  for all  2 (M jV1);  2 (M jV2): 2
From theorem 4 we know that (15) implies that to study the convergence of the open-
loop Nash equilibrium solution we can restrict ourselves to the study of the set of Riccati
dierential equations (4-5) at time 0. We will denote the corresponding solutions of (4-5)
by Ki(0; tf), respectively. So the question is under which conditions the solutions of this
set of equations will converge if tf increases. Note that Ki(0; tf ) can be viewed as the
solution k(t) of an autonomous vector dierential equation _k = f(k), with k(0) = k0
for some xed k0, and where f is a smooth function. Elementary analysis shows then
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that Ki(0; tf ) converges to a limit k only if this limit k satises f(k) = 0. Therefore,
we immediately deduce from theorem 6 the following necessary condition for convergence.
Lemma 9:
Ki(0; tf) can only converge to a limit Ki(0) if the set Kpos is nonempty. 2
Note that dichotomic separability of M implies that Kpos is nonempty. On the other
hand it is not dicult to construct an example where Kpos is nonempty, whereas M is
not dichotomically separable.
In the appendix we give an elementary proof of the following result (see also Abou-Kandil
et al (1993, section 4))
Theorem 10:
Assume that the well-posedness assumption (15) holds.







CA V2 = IR3n;
K1(0; tf)! Y0X 10 ; and K2(0; tf )! Z0X 10 ;








Combination of the results from theorem 10 and corollary 7 yields then
Corollary 11:
If the planning horizon tf in the dierential game (1) tends to innity, the unique
open-loop Nash equilibrium solution converges to a stationary feedback strategy ui (t) =
 R 1ii BTi Kix(t); i = 1; 2, which stabilizes the associated closed-loop system, if the fol-
lowing conditions are satised:
1. all conditions mentioned in theorem 10
2. Re  > 0;8 2 (M jV1):
Moreover, these constant feedback matrices can be calculated from the eigenspaces of
matrix M (see theorem 10). 2
V. The innite-planning horizon case
In this section we assume that the performance criterium player i = 1; 2 likes to minimize,





The information structure both players have at the beginning of the game is similar to
the nite-planning horizon case. One additional assumption we make is that matrix Qi
is positive denite (instead of semi-positive denite) w.r.t. the controllable subspace
< A;Bi >; i = 1; 2: This has the immediate implication that, for well-posedness sake of
the performance criteria, the equilibrium strategies we are looking for must be such that
once they are applied, the state of the system converges to zero. In the appendix we
prove the following theorem:
Theorem 12:
Let K1 and K2 be solutions of the algebraic Riccati equations (ARE) satisfying the ad-
ditional constraint that the eigenvalues of A  S1K1   S2K2 are all situated in the left
half complex plane. Then, the strategy
ui(t) =  R 1ii BTi Kix(t); i = 1; 2
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy.
Moreover, the costs obtained by using this strategy for the players areZ
1
0
f(e(A S1K1 S2K2)tx0)T (Qi +KTi SiKi)e(A S1K1 S2K2)tx0dt; i = 1; 2:
2
The next example shows that in general the innite-planning horizon problem may have
more than one open-loop Nash equilibrium, and that it is possible that the nite-planning
horizon has no solution whereas a solution to the innite-planning horizon exists.
Example 13:






Then, the eigenvalues of matrixM are f 5
22
; 1:8810; 0:1883; 1
2
; 1:7966g: Numerical calcu-
lation of the corresponding eigenspaces shows that the algebraic Riccati equations (ARE)
have 3 stabilizing solutions. So, according the previous theorem, the innite-planning
horizon game has at least 3 open-loop Nash equilibria.
On the other hand it can be shown, by constructing nal cost matrices K1f and K2f
using the same procedure as in example 3, that matrix H(t) at e.g. t = 0:1 is not always
invertible. In other words, though the innite planning horizon problem has solutions,
a solution to the corresponding nite planning horizon problem may fail to exist. 2
On the other hand one might hope that, if the nite planning horizon always has a
unique solution, then this solution always converges to a solution of the innite planning
horizon case. That this conjecture is false is illustrated by the next example:
Example 14:
15
Reconsider example 3 (continued) with the following notation: T := (T11 T12 T2 T3 T4 T5).






1 0 0 0 0
0  5
22
0 0 0 0
0 0  1:8810 0 0 0
0 0 0  0:1883 0 0
0 0 0 0  1
2
0
0 0 0 0 0 1:7966
1
CCCCCCCCCA


















we have that both K1f and K2f are semi-positive denite. Numerical calculation shows
that with these choices for the nal cost, the determinant of H(t) equals approximately
 0:02907  e 0:6883t + 2:419  e1:6083t   1:390  e1:2966t. From this we see that H(t) is
invertible for every positive t. So, the nite planning horizon problem has a unique equi-
librium for every tf . On the other hand, it is clear from theorem 10 that the equilibrium






)T := (T3 T5)
(that is the eigenspaces corresponding with the two largest eigenvalues of M , -0.1883
and 1.7966). So, the converged equilibrium solution is not a "stabilizing solution". In
other words the equilibrium solution does not converge to an equilibrium solution of the
innite game. 2
Next, we consider a class of systems for which we are able to derive both necessary
and sucient existence conditions. Following the variational (Hilbert space) approach
Friedman took in (1971) (see also Lukes and Russell (1971) and Eisele (1982)) we prove
in the appendix the following result:
Theorem 15:
Assume that matrix A is stable.
Then, u1; u2 is an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution for the innite-planning hori-







(t))T ; satisfying the property that v1(t); u1(t) :=  R 111 BT1 v2(t) and
u2(t) :=  R 122 BT2 v3(t) converge to zero if t tends to innity:
_v(t) =  Mv(t); (16)
with v1(0) = x0: 2
From this theorem we see in particular that existence of a Nash equilibrium may de-
pend on the initial state of the system. That is, it may happen that for some parameter
choices of the system matrices there are initial states of the system for which a Nash
equilibrium exists, whereas for other initial states it may fail to exist.
We conclude this section by considering the case that both players discount their future
16









where r  0 is the discount factor.
Note from the previous analysis that dropping the cross term and the end-point cost in
the cost-functional Ji has no inuence on the obtained results. So the above formulation
is as general as the one we considered before.
Now, introduce ~x(t) := e 
1
2




rtui(t): Then, straightforward analysis









f~x(t)TQi~x(t) + ~ui(t)TRii~ui(t)gdt; (17)
subject to
_~x = (A  1
2
rI)~x+B1~u1 +B2~u2; ~x(0) = x0: (18)
















CA : Using e.g. Gersgorin's theorem (see
e.g. Lancaster et al. (1985, section 10.6)) it is clear that if r is large enough, matrix ~M
will have 2n stable eigenvalues and n unstable ones. So, from theorem 15 we have the
following result:
Theorem 16:
If the discount factor r is chosen large enough (see above) in the discounted optimization
problem, then this problem has generically a unique Nash equilibrium. 2
VI. The scalar case and an economic example
We start this section by showing that the invertibility condition mentioned in theo-
rem 4 is always satised if the dimensions of both the state and the input variables in
system (1) equal one. This implies that for this kind of systems the usually stated as-
sertion that the open-loop Nash strategy is given by (8,9) is correct and, moreover, that
the associated Riccati equations yield the appropriate solution. To prove this result we
rst calculate the exponential of matrix M . To stress the fact that we are dealing with
the scalar case, we will put the system parameters in lower case, so e.g. a instead of A.
Lemma 17:

























(s1q1 + s2q2) s1(a  ) s2(a  )
0  2q2 2q1
 (s1q1 + s2q2)  s1(a+ )  s2(a+ )
1
CA ;
with the determinant of V , detV = 2(s1q1 + s2q2); and  =
p
a2 + s1q1 + s2q2.
Proof:
Straightforward multiplication shows that we can factorize M as M =
V diag(a; ; )V  1. So (see e.g. Lancaster et al (1985, theorem 9.4.3)), the expo-
nential of matrixM , eMs, is as stated above. 2
Next consider the matrix H(s) from theorem 4 for an arbitrarily chosen s 2 [0; tf ].







CA. Using the expressions in lemma 17 for V and





Clearly,H(s) is positive for every s  0. This implies in particular that H(s) diers from
zero for every s 2 [0; tf ], whatever tf > 0 is. So from theorem 4 we now immediately
have the following conclusion.
Theorem 18:
Problem (1) has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium solution:
u
1





(t) =   1
r22
b2k2(t)x(t)
where k1(t) and k2(t) are the solutions of the coupled asymmetricRiccati-type dierential
equations
_k1 =  ak1   k1a  q1 + k21s1 + k1s2k2; k1(tf) = k1f





b2i ; i = 1; 2: 2
The next theorem shows that in the scalar case the equilibrium solution always con-
verges.
Theorem 19:
Assume that s1q1 + s2q2 > 0:



















Moreover, these strategies are a solution to the innite planning horizon open-loop prob-
lem.
Proof:
Since s1q1 + s2q2 > 0; it is clear from (19) that M is dichotomically separable. Fur-
thermore we showed above that the well-posedness assumption is always satised in the
scalar case. Note that  > 0, so according to corollary 11 the open-loop Nash strate-
gies converge to a stationary feedback strategy whenever kif ; i = 1; 2; are such that
s1q1 + s2q2 + s1(a  )k1f + s2(a  )k2f 6= 0.
Now consider the case that s1q1 + s2q2 + s1(a  )k1f + s2(a  )k2f = 0: To study this
case, reconsider (23) and (24) for tf ! 1. Elementary spelling out of these formulas,
using (19), shows that also in this case both k1(0; tf) and k2(0; tf) converge to the limits
as advertised above. Using the results of theorem 12 this concludes the proof. 2
We conclude this section by illustrating the computational advantages of our approach
in an economic example. The example is taken from van Aarle et al. (1995). In this
paper they analyze a dierential game on government debt stabilization. They assume
that government debt accumulation ( _d) is the sum of interest payments on government
debt (rd(t)) and primary scal decits (f(t)) minus the seignorage (or the issue of base
money) (m(t)):
_d(t) = rd(t) + f(t) m(t); d(t0) = d0: (20)
Here d(t); f(t) and m(t) are expressed as fractions of GDP and r represents the rate
of interest on outstanding government debt minus the growth rate of output and is
assumed to be exogenous. They assume that scal and monetary policies are controlled
by dierent institutions, the scal authority and the monetary authority, respectively,
which have dierent objectives. The objective of the scal authority is to minimize a
19








f(f(t)  f)2 + (m(t)  m)2 + (d(t)   d)2ge (t t0)dt: (21)








f(m(t)  m)2 + (d(t)  d)2ge (t t0)dt: (22)
Here 1

can be interpreted as a measure for the conservatism of the central bank w.r.t.
the money growth. Furthermore all variables denoted with a bar are assumed to be xed
targets which are given a priori.
Introducing x1(t) := (d(t)  d)e 
1
2
t; x2(t) := (r d+ f   m)e 
1
2




and u2(t) := (m(t)  m)e 
1
2





























; R11 = 1 and R22 = 1.











+  + (r   1
2
)2. The corresponding eigenspaces are:
T1 = SpanfT1g where T1 = (0 0 0 0 0 1)T ;
T2 = SpanfT2g where T2 = (0 0 0 1 0 0)T ;
T3 = SpanfT3g where T3 = ( (r   ) (+ + r(r   ))    )T ;
T4 = SpanfT4g where T4 = (0 0   r   1 r 1)T ;
T5 = SpanfT5g where T5 = (
1
2










T6 = SpanfT6g where T6 = ((
1
2
   r   l)(1
2
   l) 0 (1
2
   l)  (1
2
   l) )T :
So, the only stabilizing equilibrium strategy according theorem 12 is obtained by con-
sidering the eigenspaces corresponding to the eigenvalues 1
2
 and l. This gives rise to










 (r   ) 1
2
   r + l







In particular this implies that the equilibrium strategies satisfy the relationship u2(t) =
 

u1(t): Or, stated dierently, m(t) = m(t)  (f(t)   f (t)): Substitution of the equi-















: Note that we implicitly assumed here that + + r(r  ) diers
from zero; a technical assumption which is not crucial.
The advantages of this approach are clear. First, it gives more insight into the problem.
That is, we obtain in an elementary way the optimal strategies and thus the closed-loop
dynamics of the problem, which makes it e.g. additionally possible to state an exact con-
dition (i.e. 1
2
  l < 0) under which the analysis performed by van Aarle et al. holds and
what happens if this condition is violated. Second, the approach can be straightforwardly
generalized to multi-dimensional systems and is numerically easily implementable.
VII. Concluding remarks
In this paper we reconsidered the existence and asymptotic behaviour of open-loop Nash
equilibrium solutions in the two-player linear quadratic game. Since the existing litera-
ture contains many inaccuracies w.r.t. this subject we gave an elementary selfcontained
exposition. We analyzed the nite planning horizon problem starting from its basics: the
Hamiltonian equations. We derived necessary and sucient conditions for the existence
of a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium solution in terms of a full rank condition on a
modied fundamental matrix. We showed by means of an example that in general a
solution to the set of associated dierential Riccati equations may fail to exist whereas
an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution exists. Furthermore, we showed that solvability
of these Riccati equations is in fact related to existence of a Nash solution for every
time during a xed time interval. To study convergence of the open-loop equilibrium
solution if the planning horizon is extended to innity, we therefore studied the asymp-
totic behavior of the Riccati dierential equations. To that end we rst considered the
existence of real solutions for the corresponding algebraic Riccati equations. We showed
how every real solution to (ARE) can be calculated from the invariant subspaces of the
matrix M =
0




CA. Furthermore, we showed how the eigenvalues of the
system, if the corresponding feedback control strategies are used in (1), can be obtained
from the eigenvalues of this matrix.
In particular this approach makes it possible to conclude whether (ARE) has a real so-
lution, and if so, how many solutions there are (there are always only a nite number of
solutions if the geometric multiplicity of all eigenvalues of M is one) and which of them
gives rise to control strategies that stabilize the closed-loop system. We noted that in
general (ARE) will have more than one stabilizing solution.
The results on the existence of real solutions to (ARE) were used to show that if the
dimension of the direct sum of the invariant subspaces corresponding with the n largest
eigenvalues (counted again with algebraic multiplicities) equals n, then generically the
solution to the Riccati dierential equations converges to a solution which can be directly
calculated from this direct sum. Moreover, if this solution stabilizes the closed-loop sys-
tem it also solves the innite-planning horizon problem.
21
The solution structure of the innite-planning horizon problem turns out to be much
more complicated than that of the nite-planning horizon case. Though, e.g., the nite
planning-horizon case has a unique solution at every time it may both happen that the
corresponding innite game has no solution or more than one solution. In general we
showed that the number of solutions depends on the initial state of the system. In case
matrix A is stable we derived a both necessary and sucient condition existence result.
If a discounting factor is included in the performance function that is large enough, we
reobtain uniqueness of the solution again (generically).
Since there are a number of applications which just involve scalar systems we concluded
the paper by a detailed analysis of that case. We showed that for those systems, the
unique open-loop Nash equilibrium solution can always be found by solving the associ-
ated set of Riccati dierential equations, and that this solution converges to a stationary
state feedback strategy, which stabilizes the associated closed-loop system if the planning
horizon tends to innity.
It will be clear that there are still a number of open problems in this area. In particular
it remains a challenge for future research to get a better intuition and understanding why
sometimes solutions to this open-loop problem exist whereas under some slight modica-
tions they fail to exist. Finally we note that the obtained results can be straightforwardly
generalized to the N player game.
An open problem remains to nd general conditions on the system matrices which
guarantee that the rank condition is satised.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 6:
























CA ( A+ S1K1 + S2K2):















for some matrix J and matrix X invertible, which completes this part of the proof.
"( " This part has been proved in a more general context by Meyer in (1976). However,
since the last statement of the theorem can be immediately deduced from the following
proof, we present this part of the proof here too.

























Spelling out the left hand side of this equation gives
0
B@














which immediately yields that J =  A+S1K1+S2K2. Substitution of this equality into
the right hand side of the equality shows then that Q1+A
TK1 = K1( A+S1K1+S2K2)
and Q2 +A
TK2 = K2( A+ S1K1 + S2K2), or stated dierently, K1;K2 satisfy (ARE).
This proves the second part of the theorem.
As already noted above, the last statement of the theorem concerning the spectrum
of the matrix  A + S1K1 + S2K2 follows directly from the above arguments. If we







CA, matrix M has the block-triangular structure
0
B@
 A+ S1K1 + S2K2 S1 S2
0 AT  K1S1  K1S2
0  K2S1 AT  K2S2
1
CA ; which completes the proof. 2
Proof of Theorem 10
To study the convergence of Ki(0; tf) we reconsider (13) and (14). From these formulas
we have that



























































CA  V2 = IR3n;
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and (Ji) = (M jVi), i = 1; 2.
Using this, we can rewrite K1(0; tf) and K2(0; tf) in (23,24) as ~Gi(tf) ~H
 1(tf), i = 1; 2,
where










































Here n is the element of (M jV1) which has the smallest real part.
Next, consider ~G1(tf)  Y0X 10 ~H(tf).
Simple calculations show that this matrix can be rewritten as



































As e ntfeJ2tf converges to zero for tf !1, it is obvious now that ~G1(tf ) Y0X 10 ~H(tf)
converges to zero for tf !1. Similarly it can be shown that also ~G2(tf) Z0X 10 ~H(tf)
24
converges to zero for tf ! 1. To conclude from this that K1(0; tf ) ! Y0X 10 , and
K2(0; tf )! Z0X 10 , it suces to show that ~H 1(tf) remains bounded for tf !1. This
follows, however, directly by spelling out ~H(tf) as






Proof of Theorem 12
Let K1;K2 be any pair of solutions satisfying the algebraic Riccati equations (ARE)
and the additional constraint that the eigenvalues of A  S1K1   S2K2 are all situated











(t) =  R 122BT2K2e(A S1K1 S2K2)t, is obtained by choosing u1(t) =
u
1




; u2)  limtf!1 J1(u1; u2), we have by denition that (u1; u2) is an
open-loop Nash equilibrium.
To prove this claim, we rst note that by substituting u
2
into (1), we have that









[e Ae(A S1K1 S2K2) ]x0d: Evaluating this expression by on the
one hand carrying out the dierentiation w.r.t.  and on the other hand calculating the






eA(t )(A  S1K1   S2K2)e(A S1K1 S2K2)x0d
= e(A S1K1 S2K2)tx0   eAtx0:











So, we can rewrite x(t) as:
x(t) = e(A S1K1 S2K2)tx0 +
Z t
0
eA(t )B1fR 111 BT1K1e(A S1K1 S2K2)x0 + u1( )gd
25


































(A S1K1 S2K2)tx0   vT (t)BT1K1e(A S1K1 S2K2)tx0)dt:
Since, by assumption, K1 and K2 satisfy (ARE) we can rewrite Q1 as:
Q1 =  ATK1  K1(A  S1K1   S2K2)







































) <1, which implies that we may assume without loss of generality (note
that Q1 > 08x 2< AjB1 > in J1) that limtf!1
R tf
0 e
A(tf )B1v( )d exists, we have from

















The proof of the theorem is now completed by completion of squares. Substitution of
the last expression into the formula (i) for J1 shows that we can rewrite J1 as:Z
1
0






































) is minimal by choosing u1(t) = u

1





f(e(A S1K1 S2K2)tx0)T (Q1 +KT1 S1K1)e(A S1K1 S2K2)tx0dt. 2
Proof of Theorem 15:
Suppose that u1; u2 are a Nash solution. That is,
J1(u1; u2)  J1(u1; u2) and J2(u1; u2)  J2(u1; u2): (26)
Then, for any control function w(t) for u(t) and for any real number 
J1() := J1(u1 + w; u2)  J1(u1; u2) and J2() := J2(u1; u2 + w)  J2(u1; u2): (27)
Let x(t) and x(t) be the solutions to 1 corresponding to the controls (u1; u2) and (u1+
w; u2), respectively. Then it is easily veried that
























From (27) we get
dJi()
d
j=0 = 0; i = 1; 2: (29)








T (t)R11u1(t)gdt = 0:













wT (t)R11u1(t)dt = 0:















wT (t)R11u1(t)dt = 0:




















Thus, we have that u1(t); u2(t) constitutes an equilibrium strategy if and only if x(t),
u1(t) and u2(t) satisfy (1), (30) and (31) and converge to zero if t goes to innity.
Next, we show that this statement is equivalent to the advertised result in the theorem.






)T as follows: v1(t) := x(t), v2(t) :=R
1
t e




AT (s t)Q2x(s)ds. Then u1 =  R 111 BT1 v2(t) and











CA v(t); with v1(0) = x0: (33)
Furthermore, since A is stable and x(t) ! 0 if t ! 1, elementary analysis shows that
v(t)! 0 if t!1; which concludes the "only if" part of the theorem.
On the other hand, if v satises (33) with v(t)! 0 if t!1, we introduce x(t) := v1(t);
u1 :=  R 111BT1 v2(t) and u1 =  R 122 BT2 v3(t): Since by assumption both v1(t) and
v2(t) converge to zero if t goes to innity and matrix A is stable, again elementary









AT (s t)Q2x(s)ds. So, obviously, with these notation x(t), u1(t) and u2(t)
satisfy (1), (30) and (31), and converge to zero if t goes to innity, which concludes the
proof. 2
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